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PAKISTAN: FRONTLINE STATE AGAIN?

by

David S. Rivard

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Thesis Advisor:

Peter R. Lavoy

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David S. Rivard
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B.S., Wayne State University, 1982

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
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
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


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
Approved by:



Peter R. Lavoy, Thesis Advisor



Maria Moyano, Second Reader



Frank Teti, Chairman

Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to determine Pakistan's place in contemporary U.S. national security strategy. Today, U.S.-Pakistan relations are strained due to the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment prohibits arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan in response to Pakistani efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. This thesis provides a historical background to the current impasse by examining Pakistani foreign policy since 1947. Next, the study examines the evolution of U.S. interests and security objectives in South And Southwest Asia. Current security objectives analyzed are the U.S. strategies to contain Iran and Iraq and to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region. In order to attain security objectives in the region, the author concludes that the U.S. needs a close cooperative relationship with Pakistan. Since the Pressler Amendment stands as the greatest obstacle to improved U.S.-Pakistan relations, the amendment should be repealed.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of this study is to determine Pakistan's appropriate place in contemporary U.S. national security strategy. Today, U.S.-Pakistan relations are strained due to the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment prohibits arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan in response to Pakistan's development of a nuclear weapon capability. U.S.-Pakistan relations are strained because historically, Pakistan has measured the depth of relations with the United States by the amount of military aid the United States could supply to Pakistan. This thesis provides a historical background to the current impasse by examining Pakistani foreign policy since 1947. Next, the study examines the evolution of U.S. interests and security objectives in South And Southwest Asia. Current security objectives analyzed are the U.S. strategies to contain Iran and Iraq and to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region.

The historical animosity between India and Pakistan created a South Asian cold war that coincided with the beginnings of the U.S.-Soviet cold war. Throughout the U.S.-Soviet cold war, Pakistan sought alignments with other countries to gain military and economic aid to deter aggression from the militarily superior India. Pakistan played a pragmatic game of survival shifting alignments and alliances between the United States, China and the Islamic countries of Southwest Asia.

In the 1950's Pakistan quickly became an ally of the United States in Washington's strategy to contain communism. As a member of both SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan became the linchpin of U.S. efforts to defend the Middle East and deny Soviet encroachment into South Asia. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance was undermined as the United States sought balanced ties with both India and Pakistan in the 1960s. This shift in U.S. policy was evident when the United States increased economic and military aid to India to deflect a growing Soviet influence in the region. The Pakistanis saw increased aid to India as a direct threat to the survival of Pakistan. To counter a stronger India, Pakistan sought close relations with India's enemy, China. Throughout the 1960s, Pakistan received military aid

and political support from China, as Pakistan acted as a regional balancer to Chinese perceptions of Soviet expansion in Asia.

After the 1971 Bangladesh war, Pakistan became disillusioned with the United States and China, both of whom did not intervene militarily to prevent India from dismembering Pakistan. Pakistan turned to the Islamic states of Southwest Asia, as the OPEC nations proved themselves capable of strangling the western economies. As the preeminent military power in the Islamic world, Pakistan provided the OPEC countries with contract military personnel to train their armies in the operation and maintenance of modern weapon systems. In return, Pakistan received financial aid from the OPEC nations to purchase weapons on the open market.

When India detonated its nuclear explosive device in 1974, Pakistan asked for, but was denied a nuclear guarantee from the United States in the case of a nuclear attack from India. With few options left in the face of a nuclear threat from India, Pakistan started a nuclear weapons program. The nuclear option offered Pakistan two critical incentives to strengthen its defense against Indian aggression. First, the nuclear option afforded Pakistan a means to deter aggression from any militarily superior rival. Second, Pakistan felt that a nuclear weapon capability would end the vicious cycle of dependence on external sources of arms supply.

U.S. pressure on human rights issues and concerns that Pakistan was developing a nuclear weapon plagued U.S.-Pakistan relations in the late 1970's. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan was able to find a place once again in U.S. containment policy. By supporting the Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against the Soviets, Pakistan once again found economic and military aid from the United States. Congressional suspicion that Pakistan, in spite of U.S. military aid, was still seeking to develop a nuclear weapon resulted in the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. In order for Pakistan to receive U.S. military and economic aid, the Pressler Amendment required that the president annually certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the U.S. no longer viewed Pakistan as a front-line state against communist aggression requiring military aid. In

1990, President Bush could not certify Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon capability, cutting off U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan.

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the cold war, Pakistan faces new challenges in its quest for security. The end of the cold war has not decreased tensions between India and Pakistan. In the mid and late 1980's, India and Pakistan twice came close to war over border tensions. The two countries remain deadlocked over the status of Kashmir. And both countries now seek ballistic missile capabilities to deliver nuclear warheads in the event of another war.

Pakistan is currently seeking better relations with the United States and hoping to reverse the devastating impact of the Pressler Amendment on the material readiness of its conventional forces. On the nuclear issue, Pakistan has offered to move in conjunction with India toward U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals, attempting to divert U.S. nonproliferation pressure toward India. Pakistan once again is trying to find a place in U.S. national security strategy, by portraying itself as a moderate, democratic, Islamic state whose geostrategic location at the tri-junction of South Asia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf intimately ties U.S. regional interests and objectives to the future of Pakistan.

Pakistan is also looking to deepen its ties with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), who recently have downplayed their political support for Pakistan. Without a Soviet threat in the region, China is increasingly looking at the economic potential of India. China and India are working to reach an agreement concerning the disputed Sino-Indian border while increasing bilateral trade.

Finally, Pakistan is trying to build strategic depth by looking to the Central Asian Republics (CAR) and the Middle East. The CAR along with Iran and Turkey offer Pakistan a regional grouping to enhance economic growth of these Muslim states, while building a regional grouping of political support based in the commonality of Islam. Pakistan seeks to serve the CAR interests with commercial infrastructure through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean, that will allow these emerging markets access to Europe and the Far East.

U.S. interests and security objectives in the region have shifted from the containment of communism to the containment of Iran and Iraq and the prevention of nuclear

proliferation in the region. Pakistan's location at the tri-juncture of South Asia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf figures prominently in two critical U.S. national security objectives in the region. One stated objective is to cap, reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons from both India and Pakistan that could prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Present U.S. strategy to attain this objective has shifted from trying to get India and Pakistan to move in unison, toward trying to pressure Pakistan to make a unilateral move to cap its program as a first step to break the deadlock.

The Department of Defense (DoD) also seeks to contain the governments of Iran and Iraq. To protect U.S. interests in the region, DoD's present strategy is supported by five pillars. These include: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power projection capability from the U.S. and readiness to fight. Security assistance depends on the United States ability to improve the defense capabilities of regional friends. This concept includes: foreign military sales, foreign military financing, International Military Education and Training and mobile training and technical assistance teams.

The Pressler Amendment barring transfers or sales of arms from the United States to Pakistan undermines U.S. national security strategy in the region. The Pressler Amendment prioritizes nuclear nonproliferation goals above the regional security imperatives and objectives that have come to the forefront of U.S. national security strategy since the end of the cold war. U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons appear destined to fail. The security threat from India still persists. The underlying motives for Pakistan to choose a nuclear option in the first place remain intact. Only the modernization and improvement of Pakistan's conventional military capabilities to deter Indian aggression may provide the impetus Pakistan requires to unilaterally move toward U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals.

U.S. and Chinese efforts to improve relations with India are based on the size and potential of the Indian economy. This emphasis, which both the United States and China wish to cultivate disregards the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to U.S. national security strategy in the Middle East concerning containment of Iran and Iraq. Serving as the eastern flank to this containment strategy, Pakistan could become a frontline state once again for the

United States. Pressler undermines Pakistan's participation as a friendly nation, since the United States would be unable to provide security assistance to a level which would allow Pakistan to become an effective member in this cooperative defense agreement. The Pressler Amendment effectively has moved Pakistan closer to Iran risking the creation of a anti western bloc of countries near the entrance of the Persian Gulf. If Pakistan moves closer to Iran, the risk of nuclear weapon technology transfer to Iran also increases.

The Pressler Amendment should be repealed. In order to achieve national security objectives in the region, the United States requires close cooperative relations with Pakistan. Barring U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan undermines cooperative relations and isolates Pakistan in the region. Instead of isolating Pakistan, the United States needs to elevate Pakistan into a more regional leadership role in support of U.S. national security interests and objectives in the region. In this way, Pakistan can once again be a frontline state for U.S. global security plans.

I. INTRODUCTION

In South Asia, the post-cold war era offers the United States unique challenges and opportunities to achieve national security objectives. The United States once again is assessing its relations with Pakistan in the context of post-cold war security objectives in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region. In the span of a decade, U.S. security objectives have changed from containment of communism to containment of Iran and Iraq and nuclear nonproliferation in the region. Historically, Pakistan has measured the depth of U.S.-Pakistan relations by the amount of military aid the U.S. could supply Pakistan. Within this context, the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) has severely strained U.S.-Pakistan relations in the post-cold war era.

The Pressler Amendment prohibits arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan in response to Pakistan's development of a nuclear weapon capability. Since sanctions were invoked against Pakistan in 1990, the Pressler Amendment has become the center of a controversial debate concerning U.S. strategies to achieve national security objectives in South and Southwest Asia.

The debate centers on whether U.S. arms transfers or sanctions can best influence Pakistan. Many in the U.S. Congress feel that supplying arms to Pakistan would undermine U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts throughout the world. Others in Congress feel that arms transfers could be a useful tool to build closer relations with Pakistan. The executive branch views closer relations with Pakistan as critical to a U.S. security strategy of supporting moderate Islamic democracies, bolstering Pakistan's ability to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and facilitate cooperative drug interdiction and counterterrorism efforts with the United States.

The debate hinges on two fundamental issues that the executive branch and the majority of Congress can not reach a consensus. First, are U.S. interests in the region so critical that the U.S.

should make an exception in Pakistan's case and retreat from its stated goals and policies concerning nuclear nonproliferation? Second, due to the historical animosity between India and Pakistan, do U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan heighten tensions between India and Pakistan, creating a more unstable and dangerous South Asia? These issues are not new in U.S.-Pakistan relations, but rather they reflect U.S. foreign policy experiences in South Asia since India and Pakistan became independent states in 1947.

As the United States reevaluates its relations with Pakistan to achieve regional security and nuclear nonproliferation objectives, the cold war legacy of U.S.-Pakistan relations weighs heavily in many analyst minds. The legacy of U.S.-Pakistan relations during the cold war varies from being perceived as a zero sum game, to one of wasted U.S. resources when analyzed in the context of the Indo-Pak relations. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry recently characterized U.S. cold war relations in the subcontinent as a no-win situation. Due to the historical animosity and tension between India and Pakistan, Perry stated that when American relations warmed with either India or Pakistan they automatically had to cool with the other.¹ During the cold war, the United States chose a national security strategy of providing military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan at different times to bolster their individual defense capabilities to deter communist encroachment into South Asia. Due to India's persistent desire of remaining nonaligned from either the United States or the Soviet Union, the majority of U.S. aid went to Pakistan. The militarily inferior Pakistanis offered the United States a reliable ally in the region in a quest to receive U.S. military aid that would enable Pakistan to reach military parity with the larger India. While the U.S. foreign policy reflected

¹ Prepared remarks of William J. Perry to the Foreign Policy Association, "Establishing strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan," Defense Issues 10 no.10 (31 Jan 1995).

a global threat of communism, India and to a greater degree Pakistan looked to the other side of the Indo-Pak border as the greatest threat to their national security. Within this context, both India and Pakistan saw U.S. military and economic aid channelled to their regional adversary as a direct threat to the territorial integrity of their respective countries.

Due to the irretractability of the Indo-Pak dispute, the United States often chose to pursue close relations with either Pakistan or India at the expense of the other. Motives for fundamental shifts in U.S. policy were in response to the greater threat that the Soviet Union posed to South Asia and the Middle East. Robert McMahon, at one extreme of analyzing cold war U.S. relations in the context of the Indo-Pak dispute, describes the U.S.-Pakistan alliance of 1954 as consummating U.S. foreign policy failure in South Asia. McMahon argues that by enlisting Pakistan into its anti-communist defense network in the early years of the cold war, the United States exacerbated Indo-Pak tensions by bringing the cold war to South Asia. By arming Pakistan, the United States triggered an Indo-Pak arms race that caused regional instability. The United States used Pakistan as a cold war pawn to contain an illusory communist threat. Within this framework, McMahon and the Asia Society prescribe that the United States in the post cold war era follow a foreign policy strategy of balanced ties to both India and Pakistan to reduce tension between the two bringing regional stability to South Asia.²

When analyzed outside of the context of Indo-Pak relations, one author feels that U.S. relations with Pakistan during the cold war were beneficial to the United States. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, a one time professor at the U.S. Army War College, asserts U.S. efforts to seek balanced relations

² Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 342-343 and The Asia Society, South Asia and the United States: After the Cold War (The Asia Society: New York, 1994), 6.

with India and Pakistan are doomed to fail. Tahir-Kheli states that if Pakistan is considered by the United States as part of Southwest Asia, U.S. geostrategic interests favor preserving the territorial integrity of Pakistan giving rise to Pakistan as a greater priority over India in U.S. strategic thought.³ Within this context, Pakistan's geostrategic location will always weigh heavily in U.S. foreign policy formulation as long as the United States national security interests and objectives are focused in Southwest Asia, particularly the Persian Gulf region.

While the debate continues concerning whether U.S. foreign policy in South Asia during the cold war served long term U.S. interests in the region, one absolute of Indo-Pak relations remains after the end of the cold war. Since the partition of India in 1947, Pakistan has been involved in a South Asian cold war with India. Pakistan's perception of an Indian threat to the territorial integrity and survival of Pakistan has persisted within and after the end of the U.S.-Soviet cold war. Pakistan's foreign policy strategy from independence to the present has been based on the perceived need to align with other countries. Through alignments and alliances, Pakistan has found throughout time the necessary economic and military aid to strive for military parity with India and gain political support to deter Indian aggression, insuring survival of the Pakistani state.

A. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this study is to determine Pakistan's appropriate place in present-day U.S. national security strategy. To determine a prescription for U.S.- Pakistan relations, this thesis presents a case study of Pakistan foreign relations since 1947. This case study which highlights Pakistani perceptions is mirrored by current U.S. interests and security objectives in the region. This

³ Sharin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York : Praeger, 1982), 160-161.

methodology is chosen to answer four questions. First, what were the conditions that historically caused Pakistan to shift and maintain alignments with the United States, China and the Islamic states of Southwest Asia during the cold war? Second, with the end of the cold war, how have Pakistani security objectives changed? Third, how have U.S. interests and objectives changed in the region? Last, what advantage does re-inclusion of Pakistan in the U.S. national security strategy offer, in light of what Pakistan would require from the United States to be an ally once again for the United States? The answer to these questions will be used to form a conclusion as to whether the Pressler Amendment impedes attainment of national security objectives in South and Southwest Asia.

Chapter I of this study explores the roots of Pakistan's national security strategy and the emergence of a South Asian cold war coinciding with the beginnings of the U.S.-Soviet cold war. This section explains how Pakistan operated independently of the ideologically based U.S.-Soviet cold war system to insure its territorial integrity against Indian aggression. During this time, Pakistani balance of power considerations vis-a-vis the militarily superior India drove Pakistan to seek a place in the national security strategy of the United States, China and the Islamic States of Southwest Asia in a quest to achieve military parity with India.

Chapter II explains how the regional balance of power has changed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The absence of a Soviet threat in the region has brought into question the advantage that close relations with Pakistan had to offer toward both China and U.S. security interests in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union has also offered Pakistan a chance for diplomatic relations and economic integration with the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CAR). As the threat against Pakistan from India remains constant, Pakistan is presently trying to

deepen ties with both China and the Islamic states of Southwest Asia while trying to revive a severely strained relationship with the United States.

Chapter III of this study considers how U.S. national security strategy and objectives in South and Southwest Asia have changed. Specifically, two objectives and strategies will be addressed. The first objective in South Asia concerns nuclear nonproliferation. Faced with a nuclear stalemate in South Asia, the United States is attempting to formulate a strategy to induce Pakistan to cap its nuclear program. The second objective concerns containing Iran and Iraq. United States Central Command (CENTCOM) has developed a strategy of U.S. military cooperation and interoperability with the Southwest Asian states to contain the Iran and Iraq governments. Pakistan currently is considered the eastern flank of this strategy.⁴ Due to the constraints imposed on Pakistan by the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Pakistan's ability to be an active participant in a U.S. strategy to defend interests in the Persian Gulf region is severely constrained.

Chapter IV considers the historical debate concerning the Pressler Amendment and how the rationale for arms transfers and sanctions has evolved since the legislation was written. Currently, the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act stands as the greatest obstacle to improving U.S. relations with Pakistan. The Pressler Amendment which bars U.S. foreign military sales and aid to Pakistan has pitted the U.S. executive branch foreign policy objectives in South and Southwest Asia against a congressional quest to halt nuclear proliferation. Since Pressler was invoked against Pakistan in 1990, the executive branch has made three attempts to circumvent the strictures of the Pressler Amendment which have contradicted U.S. national security strategy in the region. The

⁴ Prepared statement of Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III, USA, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 14, 1995. "Meeting the Challenge in Central Command" Defense Issues, 10 no. 53. /defenseink/ internet via WWW.

debate over the Pressler Amendment represents the difference in perception between the executive branch and Congress concerning U.S. national security objectives in the region and ultimately the context of U.S.-Pakistan relations to achieve those objectives.

Chapter V sets forth the specific constraints the Pressler Amendment imposes on Pakistani participation and support for current U.S. regional security strategy and objectives. The precise question to be answered will be, with the absolutes of the Pressler Amendment, can Pakistan be integrated into the U.S. regional security strategy or could Pressler possibly drive Pakistan to counter U.S. objectives? The chapter concludes with an analysis of, whether, in light of present U.S. interests in the region, the Pressler Amendment should be repealed, amended or maintained to achieve national security objectives in South and Southwest Asia.

II. A COLD WAR WITHIN

The origin of Pakistan's national security strategy is found in tracing Pakistan's entry into independence. Before Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, a basis of tension was created between the Hindus and Muslims of greater India. This tension led to three wars between the post-colonial states of Pakistan and India. Throughout the U.S.-Soviet cold war, the militarily inferior Pakistan sought alignments with the United States, China and the Islamic states of Southwest Asia to reach for military parity and gain political support to deter Indian aggression.

A. LEGACY OF PARTITION

The origins of Pakistan's national security strategy and the South Asian cold war can be traced to the British colonial administrative strategy of "Divide and Rule." The British in the late nineteenth century exploited separatist Muslim feelings to forestall a united Indian nationalist movement against colonial rule in British India. The British rulers contended that the antipathies between Hindus and Muslims made nationhood for the Indian people impossible.⁵ These feelings reinforced by the British, resulted in demands for a separate Muslim electorate in 1906 as the British allowed the first parliament bodies in India. With the passage of the Government of India Act of 1935, elections were held for newly created provincial legislatures. As the Muslim league won only 4.8 percent of the Muslim vote, Muslim League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah embarked on a new strategy against Indian Congress domination stating that Islam was in danger and the congress was attempting to divide Muslims in a bid to win Hindu domination throughout the country.⁶

⁵ Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 1.

⁶ Ganguly, The Origins of War, 18-24.

Jinnah hardened his stand in 1942 demanding a separate state where Muslims could be fully represented in a government based on the teachings of Islam. This stand, that the Muslim minority of India constituted a nation in itself, was in direct contradiction to Nehru's vision of a united secular nation of India.⁷

The ultimate partition of India in 1947 created both the Muslim theocracy in the state of Pakistan and the secular India. Partition set the stage for both continued tension and a balance of power relationship, measured in military capabilities, between the two countries which would define regional security and insecurity in South Asia.

Tensions between the two countries arose out of the communal bloodbath which accompanied partition.⁸ Thousands of Muslims and Hindus were slaughtered as they crossed the new borders seeking refuge in Pakistan and India respectively. Tensions were further escalated when the Hindu leader of the predominately Muslim border state of Kashmir acceded to the Indian union in October of 1947. A Muslim tribal revolt, supported by Pakistan, was controlled by the introduction of Indian regular forces into the region. As the two states moved closer to general war, the UN intervened to draw a cease-fire line that divides the disputed region to the present.⁹

The disputed region of Kashmir represents the source of conflict and tension in the region. For both India and Pakistan, the Kashmir region represents the legitimacy of each country's claim as to the organizing principle of a nation, thus the legitimate status as a sovereign state in the world

⁷ Ganguly, The Origins of War, 23-24.

⁸ Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest For Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 31.

⁹ Kavic, India's Quest For Security, 32-36.

system. India views the legitimacy of a united secular India is founded on the inclusion of the Muslim majority state of Kashmir. For Pakistan, the Muslim majority of Kashmir can only be represented in a Muslim theocracy. Pakistan's national interest, which is first survival of the state's territorial integrity, legitimizes Pakistan's claim as a nation of Muslims separate from the greater India.

The military capabilities and thus the balance of power between India and Pakistan was defined by the formula for division of British India's assets at partition. The military assets of British India were proportioned 64:36 in India's favor to reflect the approximate communal balance between the two countries.¹⁰ With tensions between the two countries high as a result of partition and the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan saw India's military superiority as a direct threat to their nation's survival and immediately began to seek military and economic assistance from other countries.

B. PAKISTAN: A FRONTLINE STATE

As early as October of 1947, the government of Pakistan sought a \$2 billion dollar loan from the United States to meet its perceived military and economic requirements. The Truman administration turned down this request because, in the period 1947-1949, the United States had neither the time nor resources for Pakistan in light of the Soviet threat to Europe.

With the first explosion of a nuclear device by Russia and the loss of China to the communist in 1949, U.S. interests towards South Asia were reappraised. With the United States looking closer at the communist threat to greater Asia, Pakistan soon found a place in U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting U.S. involvement in the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty. Pakistan's political support of early U.S. security objectives in Asia combined with India's early appeasement

¹⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 7.

of communist China led the United States to perceive Pakistan as a cooperative state in South Asia. By the end of the Korean War Pakistan was seen as a staunch supporter of the west.¹¹

Truman's policy toward South Asia favored tilting to India, perceiving it as the largest geopolitical prize, based on its size and population, in the early cold war calculus. Nehru's uncompromising attitude toward non-alignment with either cold war superpower led Washington to believe that India would not play a role in containment of communism in South Asia.¹² With India out of the picture and Pakistan willing to align with the west, the United States developed a national security strategy involving Pakistan to achieve the national security objective of containing communism in South Asia.

Early U.S. containment objectives in South Asia were to deny the Soviets warm water ports in the Indian Ocean and to deny Soviet expansion into the Middle East, which could disrupt the flow of oil to the west. Thinking in these terms, the Eisenhower administration sought to organize a regional grouping for defense of the Middle East. At the time Pakistan and Turkey were considered to be "very strong bulwarks" to contain communism. The concept of "the northern tier states" was thus enunciated. Pakistan because of its geostrategic location would serve as the vital link between Southeast Asia and the Middle East in the U.S. strategy to contain communism. The U.S. Department of Defense saw Pakistan's strategic location as a possible launch area for long range

¹¹ Rashmi Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1983 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983), 3-5.

¹² McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 57-58.

strategic bombing of the USSR. Others saw its location ideal for covert surveillance of the Soviets and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Persian Gulf oil fields.¹³

In 1953, military and economic aid was granted to Pakistan. Fearing a stronger Pakistan, India protested. When the United States considered the geostrategic importance of a U.S.-Pakistan alignment, Indian opposition to this new relationship did not appear as a costly liability to U.S. foreign policy at this time. Pakistan confirmed its commitment to the west by signing the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement and became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and then signed the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which the United States took an active part in 1958 under the label of CENTO.¹⁴

While negotiating each mutual defense agreement, Pakistan sought assurances from the United States for military aid in the event of armed aggression from India. The United States in each case purposely avoided becoming embroiled in the Indo-Pak dispute by stipulating mutual defense would only be guaranteed in the case of armed aggression from a communist controlled country.¹⁵

While Pakistan did not receive the assurance it sought from the United States, Pakistan reaped the whirlwind with its newly acquired alliance with the United States. During the 1950's, economic aid from the United States amounted to 40 percent of Pakistan's government outlays to foster economic development. The 1950's saw 80 percent of U.S. foreign assistance to South Asia going

¹³ McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 68.

¹⁴ Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947- 1983, 11-14.

¹⁵ Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947- 1983, 13.

directly to Pakistan. Extensive military aid, in the form of equipment and training, reduced Pakistan's worst fear of armed aggression from India, as the military capabilities of Pakistan rose toward parity with India.¹⁶

The U.S.-Pakistan alliance throughout the 1950's served U.S. interests as a deterrent to communist expansion in South and Southwest Asia while quenching Pakistan's thirst for security against India. In 1959, this relationship was jeopardized by the spread of Soviet influence in India. India had traditionally bought military equipment from western sources because of the large amount of foreign aid India received from the west, especially from the United States. John Kavic argued that if India bought from the Soviets the perception in the United States may cause a cutoff of economic development funds from the United States. But in the period 1959-62, the Soviets offered too lucrative a deal in the sale, licensing and payments toward Soviet aircraft up to and including the MIG-21. Kavic further argued that India started to buy from the Soviets, looking for a symbolic Soviet relationship in the face of increased tensions with India's northern neighbor China.¹⁷

C. A CHANGING U.S. POLICY

Faced with an expanding Soviet sphere of influence in India, Washington was compelled to tilt to the enemy of its "most allied of allies." When Kennedy came to office he had a history as a senator for tilting to India. As the Eisenhower Administration saw Pakistan as the linchpin to U.S. national security objectives in South Asia, Kennedy reverted to the philosophy that the geopolitical prize in South Asia was India. In 1958, Kennedy working toward increased aid to India, wrote that

¹⁶ Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947- 1983, 15.

¹⁷ Kavic, India's Quest for Security, 112-113.

"if India collapses, so may all of Asia." Once in office, the Kennedy administration was ready to run substantial risks with Pakistan to win the alignment of India.¹⁸

As the United States increased economic aid to India, Pakistan viewed the aid as indirect military aid, as it enabled India to purchase weapons with American money. Pakistan felt that the United States was giving more favorable treatment to a neutral country than one of its allies. As disillusionment with the United States grew, Pakistan started to move counter to U.S. interests in South Asia to diversify their sources of military and economic aid in the face of a stronger India. In 1961, Pakistan signed an oil exploration agreement with Moscow and supported China's representation in the UN.¹⁹

In 1962, when tensions on the Sino-Indian border erupted into war, Pakistan requested that the United States tie military aid to India contingent on the settlement of the Kashmir issue. The Kennedy administration balked at this proposal, labeling it as blackmailing India during a national crisis. Kennedy also did not want to upset India, as he saw this crisis as an opportunity to draw India into an alignment with the west and worth the risk of widening the gap in U.S.-Pakistan relations.²⁰

Anwar H. Syed argues that Pakistan saw the Sino-Indian border dispute and resulting war as being provoked by Nehru to receive greater military aid from the west as the Soviets and the United States were both vying for greater influence in, if not alignment, from India. Further, the Pakistanis saw the Soviet Union, once an ally of China, seeming to have an interest in containing China. While Pakistan's overtures to China were resisted and chastised by the United States as counter to the

¹⁸ McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 262-264.

¹⁹ Jain, U.S. Pakistan Relations: 1947-1983, 19-21.

²⁰ Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1983, 19-27.

objectives of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistani foreign policy was left with few options in the face of greater military and economic support to India from both the United States and the Soviet Union. A move counter to the U.S. alliance was now considered by the Pakistanis to be in the best interest of Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India. Pakistan's foreign minister, Ali Bogra speaking before the Pakistan national congress in November of 1962 summed up the new look in Pakistan foreign policy which moved away from cold war ideology to survival instincts:

...As situations change, enemies can become friends and friends can become enemies. But the most important and eternal fact is the question of national interest, national safety, national integrity and national security, and that is of paramount importance.²¹

After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, realizing that the settlement of the Kashmir issue was critical to achieving balanced ties with both Pakistan and India, Washington sponsored Indo-Pakistan talks to negotiate the issue. Just days before the talks were to commence Pakistan announced that they and China concluded a provisional border demarcation agreement. Washington perceived the Sino-Pak border agreement as Pakistan trying to seek common cause with the enemy of India and America. By April of 1963 the Kashmir talks had bogged down and Kennedy realizing that the chances for a settlement were nil committed military aid to India to guard against another Chinese attack.²²

When Lyndon Johnson took office in late 1963, Pakistan foreign minister Bhutto announced that Pakistan would host a state visit from Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Johnson was deeply disturbed by Pakistan's willingness to forge closer ties with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),

²¹ Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: A Entente Cordiale (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), 97-107.

²² McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 301-304

who he felt were supporters of the communist insurgency in Vietnam. Bhutto defended Pakistan's move toward Beijing which he stated was not based on ideology, but rather the threat which a U.S. commitment to bolster the military capabilities of India brought against Pakistan. Johnson's advisors did not buy this position, but rather emphasized that Pakistan relations with the PRC were contradictory to Pakistan's obligations to the SEATO and CENTO alliances.²³

Johnson having a long tenure in Congress knew that continued increases in foreign aid to the sub-continent would soon be contested in Congress. While his advisors recommended a long term military and economic aid program for India, Johnson would only commit to a one year agreement. Washington also hoped the short term commitment may placate the strained U.S.-Pakistan relations. With the announcement of the U.S.-Indo aid agreement, widespread anti-western protests swept Pakistan, as the Pakistani leadership announced that they would now have to reappraise its commitments to SEATO and CENTO.²⁴ Upset with the demands that both India and Pakistan were putting on the United States, Johnson cancelled previously scheduled state visits from both countries.

D. 1965 WAR AND PAKISTAN'S TILT TO CHINA

As Johnson cancelled the state visits, India and Pakistan became engaged in border clashes in the Rann of Kutch. These skirmishes ultimately led to a war in the disputed region of Kashmir.²⁵ Frustrated with the actions of both countries, Washington prohibited the use of American weapons by both sides during the crisis. In this situation, Johnson could not reconcile support for a UN sponsored cease-fire while supplying weapons to both sides. This ultimately hit Pakistan hardest as

²³ McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 306-308.

²⁴ McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 320-323.

²⁵ Ganguly, Origins of War, 47-49.

nearly all their military equipment was supplied by the United States. India on the other hand had a large amount of Soviet weapons with which to carry out the war.²⁶

In the wake of the war Johnson cut off all aid to both countries. He felt it was time to reevaluate what exactly U.S. interests were in South Asia. Johnson was now ready to take a low profile with both India and Pakistan as he saw the war between India and Pakistan as an embarrassment to American foreign policy. Johnson's eagerness to disengage from the region, was most evident in his support for Soviet led negotiations between Pakistan and India after a UN cease-fire was secured.²⁷

At the end of the 1965 Kashmir war anti-American sentiments were running high in Pakistan. The U.S. effort to arm India in conjunction with their failure to adequately intermediate the Kashmir talks combined with an arms embargo at the end of the 1965 war, all led Pakistanis to feel that the United States had greatly neglected its ally, Pakistan.²⁸

Seeking out communist China provided appreciable dividends for Pakistan in light of the superpowers pursuit of Indian alignment. Aligning with the enemy of its enemy, Pakistan was able to influence the regional balance of power as Soviet and American aid were leading to an ever more powerful India. The Chinese were able to diplomatically link the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak conflict together not allowing the Soviet Union to openly side with India, which fostered a sense of urgency between the United States and the Soviets to terminate the war. Chinese influence brought about a cease-fire on terms acceptable to Pakistan. This made a deep and lasting impression on Pakistani

²⁶ McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 325-328.

²⁷ McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 334-335.

²⁸ Sharin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 23-24.

public opinion, making it increasingly pro-Chinese.²⁹ In the period from 1965 -1971, China fulfilled Pakistan's quest for military supplies and political support against its adversary India. By offering political support to the Chinese against India and acting as a regional balancer to a perceived Soviet expansion in Asia, Pakistan found a favorable place in China's security strategy from which Pakistan was rewarded. The U.S. arms embargo as a result of the 65' war was finally modified to allow the sale of spare parts to Pakistan in 1967. With western and Soviet sentiment tilting to India, western arms producers and the Soviets were hesitant to sell arms to Pakistan in fear of alienating India.³⁰ During this time the Chinese became a major arms supplier to Pakistan supplying nearly 200 combat aircraft, 400 tanks, surface to air missiles and countless small weapons. The terms on which these supplies were granted is still not clear, but by 1972 the Chinese had converted all previous loans to Pakistan into grants.³¹

E. 1971 WAR AND UNRELIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

In 1969, despite the arms embargo by the United States, the new leader of Pakistan, General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan saw a chance to once again become an integral part of U.S. national security interests in Asia. In a visit to Pakistan that year, President Nixon asked Yahya to act as a conduit between the United States and China in an effort to normalize relations between the United

²⁹ Seyid, China and Pakistan, 109.

³⁰ Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 24.

³¹ Seyid, China and Pakistan, 140.

States and China. Yahya agreed to handle this in the utmost secrecy and Nixon assured Yahya of his goodwill and a place for Pakistan in Nixon's emerging strategy.³²

While the origins and events leading up to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and the emergence of the independent state of Bangladesh out of what was once East Pakistan are well documented, as are the Nixon White House perceptions and actions including the dispatch of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* battle group to the Bay of Bengal, to prevent India from destroying West Pakistan as general war broke out,³³ several Pakistani perceptions in the aftermath of the war need to be emphasized. The dispatch by Nixon of Task Force 74 to the Bay of Bengal was seen by Pakistan and China as an unequivocal signal to India not to invade West Pakistan. While Nixon clearly was dependant on Yahya and sincere in his rapprochement with China, he was severely constrained domestically to provide military support in Pakistan's hour of need, due to an arms embargo he could not lift. While Nixon and Kissinger were able to use third countries to filter weapons to Pakistan, this support was seen as totally inadequate in view of the huge transfer of weapons to India by the Soviets throughout 1971, including a massive airlift of military supplies when the war broke out. Tahir-Kheli explains that a country's support and friendship is weighed by Pakistan in terms of concrete military assistance and in this case the United States fell well short of a reliable ally.³⁴

³² Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 31.

³³ For a chronology of events of the 1971 Indo-Pak crisis and war see Ganguly, Origins of War, 97-137. To understand the perceptions and actions of the Nixon White House throughout this crisis refer to Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York : Grossett and Dunlap, 1978) and Henry A Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979).

³⁴ Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 48-49.

After the 1971 war, with the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan's new prime minister Z.A. Bhutto's first concern was for security and survival of the state of Pakistan which could only be accomplished through greater defense. With the loss of \$200 million in military equipment due to the 1971 war, Pakistan sought the open market to purchase arms, spending \$115 million or 20 percent of the country's export earnings in 1972. The economic strain of these purchases forced Bhutto to request that the United States lift the arms embargo and resume military aid to Pakistan. At this time, Washington viewed Pakistan's open purchases and \$65 million worth of arms given by the Chinese as adequate to care for Pakistan's security needs not requiring a lifting of the arms embargo.³⁵ This period of Pakistan foreign policy saw Pakistan, in the face of a U.S. arms embargo, to look to the Islamic countries of Southwest Asia for economic and political support to coerce the west to once again recognize the security needs of Pakistan.

F. TILT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Faced with a perceived deficit in security and political support, Bhutto turned to the Islamic states of Southwest Asia for support. Z.A. Bhutto successfully linked the Indo-Pakistan struggle as a threat not only to Pakistan but to all Islamic states. While the Shah of Iran led OPEC to raising oil prices in 1973, Bhutto claimed that a united third world led by the wealth of the OPEC nations could challenge the superpowers who have previously bled the third world.³⁶ Bhutto's recognition of the vulnerability of the west's reliance on Middle East oil and his ability to mobilize a pan Islamic movement in Southwest Asia would pay high dividends in his quest for security from India.

³⁵ Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 57-58.

³⁶ Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 63-64.

Under Bhutto's leadership, Pakistan first received economic and military aid from the Shah who linked Pakistan's security to the territorial integrity of Iran. Financial support also came from Saudi Arabia, Lybia and Abu Dhabi to purchase arms from both the French and Chinese. In return Lybia and Abu Dhabi received contract military personnel from Pakistan, which provided these countries military expertise in the operation and maintenance of both western and eastern modern weapon systems. It is strongly believed that pressure from both the Shah and the Saudis caused Washington to reassess the geostrategic importance of Pakistan in Southwest Asia leading to a lifting of the U.S. Arms embargo in 1975.³⁷

G. THE ISLAMIC BOMB

The successful detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974, significantly altered Pakistan's strategy for insuring security against India. Bhutto looked to the United States and other western nuclear nations to provide a nuclear umbrella to safeguard Pakistan against the Indian threat. The United States and other western nuclear powers, as a reaction to the Indian test, saw a clear danger that unstable countries may acquire a nuclear capability that would pose a serious danger to peace and stability in the world. It was within this context, that the United States, Britain and France saw Pakistan with its advanced technology and infrastructure as the missing link to proliferation of nuclear weapons to both OPEC and third world countries. By denying Pakistan a nuclear umbrella, the western powers were able to physically stay out of the Indo-Pak dispute in South Asia that did not affect their national interests, while also trying to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world. From the Pakistani perspective, a nuclear deterrent was the only way to protect their state from nuclear blackmail by India to gain political concessions. Pakistan also felt that a nuclear option

³⁷ Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 88-89.

would also end the vicious cycle of dependence on external sources of arms supplies, which had driven Pakistani foreign policy since partition. With the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 fresh in the mind of Pakistan and the perception of the unreliability of the United States and China to intervene militarily for Pakistan in response to Indian aggression, Z.A. Bhutto gave the green light to start Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.³⁸

Pakistan's quest for a nuclear deterrent would greatly affect its ability to receive military aid from the west, especially the United States. With reports that Pakistan had acquired an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility, the Carter administration invoked an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which suspended aid to Pakistan in April of 1979.³⁹

H. FROM FRONTLINE TO FALLOUT

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, the geostrategic importance of Pakistan was once again reassessed by the United States. With a Soviet threat to South and Southwest Asia, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, leader of Pakistan's new martial law regime found a position in U.S. foreign policy strategy in South Asia to modernize his military with U.S. aid. The Soviet threat to Central and South Asia resulted in the Reagan administration in 1981 to announce an agreement on a six-year, \$3.2 billion military aid package to Pakistan. With the resumption of military aid, Pakistan once again became a frontline state against Soviet aggression as Pakistan was able to provide a channel for U.S. arms to the Mujahideen rebels of Afghanistan. Greater military aid to Pakistan including F-16s was also to underscore the United States interests in the security of

³⁸ Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 119-121.

³⁹ Richard P. Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff: U.S. Non Proliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 25 March 1994), Order Code IB90149, 15.

Pakistan. Even with greater aid from the United States, throughout the 1980's a major portion of Pakistani military purchases continued to be financed through aid from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Southwest Asia oil-producing countries.⁴⁰

U.S. aid in the 1980's was highly scrutinized by the U.S. Congress who still sought to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1981, Congress granted the President the authority to waive the nuclear provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in Pakistan's case until 1987, if the President deemed it necessary in pursuit of the national interest. While the President had the authority to waive the nuclear provisions of the FAA, Congress produced two significant amendments to the FAA that would single out the Pakistani program in the years to come.

The Solarz amendment sought to cut off aid to any country who attempted to export nuclear weapons technology from the United States. The Pressler Amendment to the FAA stipulated that the President was required to certify annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device in order to receive military aid. President Reagan first invoked the national security waiver in 1987 as a Pakistan national was convicted of trying to export materials from the United States that could be used in making centrifuges for enriching uranium. After 1987, without the ability to waive the pertinent provisions of the FAA the President could only certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device which both President Reagan and Bush said had become increasingly difficult after

⁴⁰ Rodney W. Jones, "The Military and Security in Pakistan," in Craig Baxter, ed. Zia's Pakistan : Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 82-83.

1987. In 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Bush did not certify Pakistan as not possessing a nuclear device invoking the Pressler Amendment which made Pakistan ineligible for U.S. assistance.⁴¹

I. CONCLUSIONS

Tensions that arose as a result of the partition of India to create a Muslim theocracy in the state of Pakistan and the first Kashmir war created a South Asian cold war. Balance of power, measured in military capabilities, that favored India, threatened the territorial integrity and thus the survival of the state of Pakistan. To reach military parity with India, Pakistan sought a place in the security interests of great powers and regional neighbors to receive military and economic aid to deter Indian aggression. In the emerging U.S.- Soviet cold war of the 1950's, Pakistan found that by politically supporting the United States and being a willing member to cooperative defense against communist aggression, they would receive massive amounts of military and economic aid.

When an ideologically based alignment with the United States was undermined by greater U.S. assistance to India, Pakistan turned to the enemy of its enemy, perceiving a Sino-Soviet split, where Pakistan could act as a regional balancer to Chinese fears of Soviet expansion in Asia. The military aid and the symbolic alignment with the Chinese would serve as a strong deterrent to Indian aggression as U.S. interests in South Asia became clouded due to the persistent Indo-Pak tensions and the 1965 Kashmir war.

In the early 1970's, Pakistan saw the west vulnerable to oil supplies and pricing from the Southwest Asia oil-producing nations. Espousing the commonality of Islam and a united third world, Pakistan sought to lead Southwest Asia regional interests against both the west and India. In the

⁴¹ Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff, 14-15.

Middle East, Pakistan found its comparative advantage as a modern military power amongst the Islamic states. Pakistan's ability to provide military training personnel and technical experts to the Middle East armies was welcomed by the OPEC nations. In return, Pakistan was rewarded with loans and grants to acquire arms on the open market to guard against western arms embargoes.

Finally, Pakistan proved most adept at playing the U.S. containment policy when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. In spite of harsh criticism from the United States on both human rights and nuclear non-proliferation, they found billions of dollars in U.S. military aid while serving once again as a front-line state against communism.

Pakistan throughout the U.S.-Soviet cold war played a pragmatic game of survival from a threat of aggression from India. The Pakistani leadership was adept at switching from ideologically based alignments, to acting as a regional balancer, to portraying itself as a modern Islamic state with a powerful military to gain military aid and political support against its historical rival India.

Due to the large amount of both economic and military aid received from the United States, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship deserves special attention. The U.S.-Soviet cold war relationship between the United States and Pakistan was most effective for both countries when U.S. foreign policy was based on attainment of geostrategic objectives. During periods when U.S. foreign policy favored geopolitical objectives such as nuclear nonproliferation or attempting to win alignment or recognizing the preeminence of India, Pakistan would act counter to U.S. interests.

The Truman administration saw the geopolitical prize in South Asia as winning alignment of the democratic India. India's non-alignment policy frustrated the United States who were developing a cold war strategy of containment. With India as an unwilling participant, geographically containing communism was left to Pakistan who would serve as the link between cooperative defense of the

Middle East and Southeast Asia. When the Kennedy administration tried to once again win alignment with India, because of India's size and democratic government, the United States was willing to sacrifice the east-west link in Asian cooperative defense. While the United States was unable to wean India away from Soviet influence, Pakistan denounced its ideological commitment to U.S. objectives in Asia by moving toward communist China to counter a stronger India, which both the Soviets and the U.S. threw economic and military aid at to win Indian alignment in the cold war battle for influence.

When Pakistan did try to serve U.S. geopolitical goals by being a secret channel for the United States to seek a rapprochement with China the results, which Pakistan was sure to measure in concrete military aid, were disastrous. Pakistan received nothing for providing an uncompromising secret channel to Beijing for the United States. As Yahya Khan did everything that the Nixon White House had asked, Pakistan saw the U.S. President as severely constrained by Congress who invoked an arms embargo against Pakistan, as a response to the repressive crackdown by the West Pakistan military attempting to quash a separatist movement in East Pakistan in March of 1971. While the separatist movement in East Pakistan was supported by India, the U.S. Congress saw West Pakistan's military regime bent toward genocide as a tool to build stability. Throughout 1971, the U.S. Congress did not understand Nixon's tilt to Pakistan as the secret channel to China was operational from March through July, then made public and ultimately preserved by a display of credibility to China as the Indo-Pak war ignited and the *Enterprise* Battlegroup was sent to the Bay of Bengal. Throughout this time, the U.S. Congress felt that the geopolitical imperative in South Asia was to support the democratic India as opposed to assisting brutal military dictatorships that the West Pakistan leadership represented.

In the 1970's, the geopolitical imperatives of human rights and preventing global nuclear proliferation drove Pakistan to find common ground in Islam with the OPEC nations of Southwest Asia who were able to strangle the western economies. It was only when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which presented a communist encroachment into the Middle East and South Asia were U.S. geopolitical goals in the region set aside to push the Soviet military out of Southwest Asia. When General Zia was threatened by the Soviets, U.S. military aid once again reach Pakistan to preserve the territorial integrity of Pakistan. General Zia used the aid to modernize the Pakistan army in order to deter Indian aggression from his east flank. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. geopolitical goals have once again resurfaced forcing the U.S. to retreat from military aid to their "most allied of allies."

III. PAKISTAN'S POST COLD WAR QUEST FOR SECURITY

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the U.S.-Soviet cold war, Pakistan faces new challenges in their quest for security from Indian aggression. In the post U.S.-Soviet cold war era, the geostrategic significance of Pakistan to both the United States and China has decreased. In the United States and China, Pakistan can no longer be considered as a bulwark or balancer against Soviet expansion in Asia. Without the historical rationale for inclusion in China's or the U.S. security strategy, Pakistan is scrambling to find economic and military assistance as the South Asian cold war has continued unabated.

In the post cold war era, South Asia has emerged as a regional flashpoint due to continued tensions between Pakistan and India. Tensions over Kashmir in both 1987 and 1990, caused Washington to believe that a future Kashmir war might involve the use of nuclear weapons.⁴² With tensions between the two countries high, the military balance of power on the subcontinent will favor India for the foreseeable future. Currently India maintains the world's fourth largest military, has ambitious plans for a blue-water navy, a growing missile (ICBM) capability, and is nearing self-sufficiency in conventional weapons.⁴³ As the Indian threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan continues, Pakistan is presently attempting to revive and deepen historical ties with the United States and China, while trying to expand an economic and political alignment of the Muslim states from Southwest Asia to include the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CAR).

⁴² Nalini Kant Jha, "Reviving U.S.-India Friendship in a Changing International Order," Asian Survey 34, no 12 (December 1994): 1035

⁴³ Iftikhar H. Malik, "Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues," Asian Survey 34, no. 12 (December 1994): 1086.

A. REVIVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

First, Pakistan is currently seeking better relations with the United States in the face of improved U.S.-Indo relations as a result of a shift in U.S. policy originating in the 1980's. S.D. Muni cites an emerging policy in the Carter administration, to recognize "regional influentials" of the third world, shifted U.S. policy in South Asia to more fully recognize the preeminence of India in world affairs. In the late 1970's, India espoused itself as a country committed to democracy and non-military use of nuclear weapons naturally drawing the Carter administration to seek improved relations with India. Despite the U.S. tilt to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States throughout the 1980s began to recognize that India was becoming stronger economically and held a promise of offering a sizable market for U.S. goods, services and investments. With the possibility that an Indian market could be critical to U.S. economic development, the United States in the 1980s developed a three pronged strategy to cultivate good relations with India.

Concerning security issues, in 1984 the United States and India concluded an agreement on the transfer of dual use (civilian and defense) technology between the two countries. Transfers of technology were augmented by military to military contacts at high levels between both countries. Technology transfers have also given rise to greater economic cooperation between the United States and India, as the United States has become India's largest trading partner. In the 1980's, the United States has refrained from criticizing India's approach to relations with its neighbors. The Pakistanis are concerned over the United States shift in policy regarding Kashmir. Historically, the United States has supported the UN mandated plebiscite to resolve the dispute which the Pakistanis have always supported. In the 1980's U.S. policy shifted toward bilateral negotiations between the

Pakistan and India which India favors as a method to resolution of the dispute. This combined with the U.S. condemnation of Pakistani support for Kashmiri militants has left the Pakistani's with little political support from the west in the post cold war era as India's economic and political strength increases.⁴⁴ Also, Pakistan is currently seeking better relations with the United States to reverse the devastating impact of the Pressler Amendment on the material readiness of their conventional forces. U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives in South Asia have thwarted Pakistan's ability to receive military and economic assistance from the United States. In light of the Pressler Amendment, Pakistan is trying to shift U.S. and international pressure to India. Pakistan over the years has presented a number of proposals to reach a regional solution for nuclear nonproliferation. Pakistan has previously proposed declaring South Asia a nuclear free zone. A recent Pakistani proposal is for a five nation initiative on the matter involving the United States, Russia, China, India and Pakistan, which was welcomed and supported by the United States.⁴⁵ To date, India has refused to participate in either regional or extra-regional dialogue concerning nuclear non-proliferation based on their historical perspective of NPT. From India's standpoint, the NPT divides the world into haves and have nots and is discriminatory in nature to developing countries. India feels that nuclear disarmament requires a global approach, that would require all states equal compliance in a worldwide nuclear regime.⁴⁶ Despite Pakistani domestic support (measured as high as 87 percent

⁴⁴ S.D. Muni, "The United States and South Asia: The Strategic Dimension," in Shelton U. Kodikara, ed, External Compulsions of South Asia Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 70-75.

⁴⁵ Iftikhar H. Malik, "Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues," 34, no. 12: 1087-88.

⁴⁶ The Asia Society, Preventing Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia (New York: Asia Society, 1995), 7.

in favor⁴⁷) for a nuclear weapon capability, the Pakistani government has continued to state that Pakistan would not export nuclear technology or any nuclear product relative to military use, adding further that Pakistan would sign the NPT if India also agrees to.⁴⁸

While trying to shift U.S. and international pressure away from Pakistan's nuclear program, Pakistan is currently trying to once again find a place in current U.S. national security strategy. Without a regional communist threat, Pakistan is espousing itself once again as a geostrategic and geopolitical critical state in U.S. foreign policy. On a recent visit to the United States, during a press conference with President Clinton, Benazir Bhutto emphasized that "Pakistan as a moderate, democratic, Islamic country of 130 million can play a positive role for U.S. interests in a politically volatile region." She also emphasized that the strategic location of Pakistan at the tri-junction of South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf, intimately ties U.S. regional interests and objectives to the future of Pakistan. Pakistan is further emphasizing its current convergence of interests with the U.S. by participating in UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti, extradition of drug traffickers and a terrorist suspect in the World Trade Center bombing and as a country who has taken positive steps to eradicate poppy cultivation and heroin laboratories in Pakistan.⁴⁹

B. DEEPENING RELATIONS WITH CHINA

In the post cold war era, Pakistan relations with China are perhaps taking on a new dimension. Historically Pakistan has described relations with China as "loftier than the Himalayas and deeper than

⁴⁷ Rais A. Khan, "Pakistan in 1991", Asian Survey 32 no. 2 (February 1992) 205.

⁴⁸ Rais A. Khan, "Pakistan in 1992," Asian Survey 33 no. 2 (February 1993) 139.

⁴⁹ Clinton: Pakistan, India Should Eliminate Nuclear Weapons. (Transcript : Clinton-Bhutto joint news conference, 12 April 1995)

the Indian Ocean." Without a Soviet threat in Asia, China appears to be more cautious in taking sides in Indo-Pakistan disputes, although China opposes a hegemonic threat that India presents in South Asia.⁵⁰ While this anti-hegemonic stance is consistent with China's regional and international policies, China is beginning to forge new relations with India .

The Pakistanis are particularly concerned over the warming of Sino-Indian relations whose roots are found in changes in Chinese foreign policy in the 1980's. Mahinda Werake cites a Chinese foreign policy shift in the 1980's from forming a "united front" against Soviet expansion to identifying more closely with the third world. Perceiving a decline in both Soviet and U.S. power throughout the decade, Werake argues China predicted the emergence of a multi-polar world where the role of the third world would be enhanced. China's independent foreign policy paralleled a shift led by the pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping to link foreign policy with China's economic development. Improving relations with India would provide China the requisite link to a traditional third world leader and provide new opportunities for economic growth based on the size and potential of the Indian market.⁵¹

The shift in Chinese policy is most evident and of particular concern to Pakistan in the Joint Working Group (JWG) between China and India working to demarcate the Sino-Indian border. The JWG has enjoyed success in instituting confidence building measures between the two armies stationed along the border as both sides are working toward a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable" agreement on how and where to define the border. Sino-Indian relations have also

⁵⁰ Khan, "Pakistan in 1992," 139.

⁵¹ Mahinda Werake, "China and South Asia in the Eighties," in Shelton U. Kodikara, ed, External Compulsions of South Asia Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 79-84.

resulted in protocols to open border trade routes in 1991, 1992 and 1993.⁵² Even more alarming to Pakistan is that China has refrained from supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir Issue since 1990. China like the United States is now calling for bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute peacefully. Concerning Kashmir, China is worried about Islamic militants fomenting violence and instability in a region so close to the Xinjiang province. With the possible threat of Islamic separatist movements spreading into China's western provinces, China is opposed to the creation of an independent Jammu and Kashmir at this time.⁵³

To offset Indian moves toward China, Benazir Bhutto in 1993 asked China to play a mediating role to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In return, Pakistan promised China political support to ward off international pressure against China by the United States.⁵⁴ While this request in 1993 was politely turned down by China, in 1995 China has agreed to mediate between Pakistan and India to resolve the dispute.⁵⁵ While the Sino-Pakistan alliance appears idealistically strong based on both countries historical relations, Chinese movements toward India point to less political support for Pakistan as China pragmatically seeks economic growth through a new regional relationship with the larger India.

⁵² Surjit Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey 34 no. 3 (March 1994), 290-292.

⁵³ Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," 298.

⁵⁴ Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1993," Asian Survey 34 no. 2 (February 1994): 199.

⁵⁵ Alli Abbas Rizvi, "China Supports Pakistan Stance On Kashmir," Asian Defence Journal (February, 1995): 92.

C. LOOKING TO SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL ASIA

The demise of the Soviet Union with the creation of the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CAR) has forged Pakistan new opportunities in a region that was previously hostile to Pakistan. Pakistan looks on the newly emerging Central Asian Muslim states as a future arena of diplomatic and economic initiatives. Pakistan visualizes a new economic region in the making comprising Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the CAR.⁵⁶ Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as founding members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) quickly invited the CAR to join the organization accenting the essential geopolitical and cultural commonalities that the CAR can bring to the ECO.

Together these countries have 300 million people and could become the largest economic block after the EEC. Plans for joint ventures in rail and road links, telecommunications networks, gas and oil pipelines, electricity grids and cross border facilities for movement of goods and people are being undertaken. Pakistan can offer the CAR the shortest outlet to the sea, and the CAR can provide Pakistan a large export market for Pakistani goods and services. As Pakistan has always looked to an Indian dominated South Asia, the CAR has provided a new opportunities to balance the regional power of India.⁵⁷

Besides Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, India is also vying for influence in Central Asia in an attempt to prevent Pakistan from becoming a dominant player in the region. Due to India's historical close relations with Moscow, India has traditional ties to the former Soviet republics. India feels they

⁵⁶ Khan, "Pakistan in 1992," 137.

⁵⁷ Iftikar H. Malik, "Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues" Asian Survey 34 no.2 (December 1994): 1089.

have a good chance now to participate in the economic development of Central Asia. India has signed agreements to promote trade, scientific and technical cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Turkmenistan.⁵⁸

Looking to the Islamic states of Southwest and Central Asia, Benazir Bhutto echoing Iranian statements has proposed an Islamic bloc for collective security. Speaking at the seventh summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) she stated:

As a first step, let us commit ourselves never to use force against each other. Let an aggression against an Islamic country be considered an aggression against all Muslim countries. Let us agree that the victim of such aggression will receive every assistance from the Islamic countries.⁵⁹

Benazir Bhutto also emphasized the economic opportunities of a unified Islamic world. Underlying the need for greater mutual trade, Bhutto emphasized that the Islamic world collectively has sizeable financial assets, large markets, low waged and adequate technical expertise to effectively increase economic activity and national prosperity for all Islamic countries.

Pakistan's recent foreign policy moves display a country whose threat has not changed but historical alignments and alliances have been undermined by the demise of the Soviet Union. Now, both the United States and China look to improve relations with India based on the size and economic potential of the Indian market. With few options left to receive military and political support against

⁵⁸ Amal Jayawardena, "Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy Since Gorbachev," in Shelton U. Kodikara, ed, External Compulsions of South Asia Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 117-118.

⁵⁹ Ali Abbas Rizvi, "Benazir Proposes Islamic Block For Collective Security" Asian Defence (February 1995): 88-90.

India, Pakistan is once again trying to create a pan-Islamic movement in Southwest and Central Asia to serve as a basis to fuel economic growth and gain political support against possible Indian aggression.

IV. PRESENT U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN THE REGION

U.S. security objectives and strategy in the Middle East and South Asia have evolved with the end of the U.S.-Soviet cold war. U.S. security objectives in the region have changed from containing communist encroachment into the Middle East and South Asia to containing Iran-Iraq and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. The United States published "National Security Policy of Engagement and Enlargement" presents an overview of the challenges to U.S. foreign policy in the region.

A. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

In the Middle East, U.S. security objectives are presently to insure the security of Israel, the United States' Arab friends and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. In Southwest Asia, the United States is committed to deter threats to regional stability particularly from the states of Iran and Iraq. The United States has a dual containment policy aimed at these two states and will continue to provide a naval presence and prepositioned combat equipment in the region to deter both these states from threatening U.S. vital interests in the gulf. U.S. policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian government in several areas including, obtaining weapons of mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism and its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region. A major objective in the Gulf is to reduce the chances another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of an existing state. The United States is committed to work closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC) on collective security arrangements, help GCC states meet military requirements and maintain U.S. bilateral defense

agreements. Recognizing the expansion of democracy and economic reform in South Asia, the United States hopes to help the people of the region enjoy the fruits of democracy and greater stability through efforts to resolve long standing conflicts and implementing confidence building measures between India, Pakistan and China. The United States has engaged both India and Pakistan to cap, reduce and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities. The United States believes that greater regional stability and improved bilateral ties will be important for America's growing economic interest in the region.⁶⁰

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations in May of 1995, articulated the framework and reasons for the U.S. strategy to contain Iran and Iraq. The framework of U.S. strategy is based on three components which are bolstering the defense capability of our allies, maintaining a forward presence in the region and forging access agreements with allies. This strategy requires the United States to bolster bilateral defense working relationships with each of these countries to consider arms purchases and plan joint military training and exercises. The second part of the strategy is to improve the collective defense capabilities of the gulf nations through the GCC. Third, the United States seeks access agreements for staging pre-positioned equipment to "ratchet" up U.S. forces quickly in the region should hostilities break out that threaten U.S. interests.

The U.S. dual containment policy is designed to contain, limit and isolate the aggressive, violent behavior of both Iran and Iraq for the following reasons. The United States considers both countries as hostile to their gulf neighbors and to Israel, countries allied with the United states. Both

⁶⁰ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House 1995.

Iran and Iraq are considered by the U.S. to be among the worlds most dangerous nuclear proliferation threats. While Iraq's record concerning aggression is well documented, the United States is particularly concerned about Iran's military build-up on several small gulf islands in the Straits of Hormuz, through which 90 percent of the gulf oil exports travel through. Recently Iran has added several thousand troops to these islands equipped with artillery, anti-ship missiles and chemical weapons. Adding to the problem has been Iran's acquisition of submarines with mine-laying capabilities and patrol boats with anti-ship missiles.⁶¹

B. CENTCOM CONTAINMENT STRATEGY

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Gen Binford Peay, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) outlined specific objectives to be attained in order to contain Iraq and Iran. Noting that the CENTCOM area of responsibility extends from Egypt and East Africa through the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan, Peay emphasized that this strategy required "carefully cultivated regional ties." Gen Peay emphasized that the theater strategy was supported by five pillars. They include forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance and power projection from the United States. While forward presence is most clearly identifiable in continued U.S. naval presence in the region, gaining access for prepositioning of combat equipment in the region to quickly link personnel to equipment is a tactical imperative for CENTCOM. Currently the United States has a brigade set of equipment pre-positioned in Kuwait. CENTCOM goals currently are to establish a second brigade set with a division base in Southwest Asia. Once a second brigade set is established, CENTCOM hopes to position a third set in the region which will

⁶¹ Prepared remarks of U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, "Working with Gulf Allies to Contain Iraq and Iran" Defense Issues 10 no. 61, (May 18, 1995).

allow for a heavy division's worth of equipment, adding flexibility, the requisite firepower and command and control to increase U.S. military capabilities in the early phases of a military operation. Through a continued naval presence and increased pre-positioning of combat equipment throughout the region, CENTCOM hopes to enhance U.S. war fighting capabilities and show American resolve to protect their interests in the region.

Another pillar is to provide security assistance to regional friends. This pillar involves improving the defense capabilities of regional friends, training regional militaries, promoting interoperability, strengthening military to military relationships and increasing overtime the ability of states to provide for individual and collective defense. Essential to achieve these objectives is foreign military sales, foreign military financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and mobile training and technical assistance field teams. CENTCOM feels these activities not only support regional defensive arrangements, but also provide a degree of U.S. control over arms transfers to the region. Presence, forward pre-positioning of equipment and improving the defense capabilities of regional friends are all critical to the U.S. national security objective of containing Iraq and Iran.⁶²

C. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

U.S. interest in nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia stems from the region already being a flashpoint for conflict, the demands a nuclear exchange would put on the United States and the threat with which a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India would create to U.S. interests worldwide. In testimony to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March of 1995, assistant

⁶² Prepared statement of Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III, USA, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 14, 1995. "Meeting the Challenge in Central Command" Defense Issues, 10 no. 53. /defenselink/ internet via WWW.

defense secretary Joseph Nye reinforced that the history of bitter animosity between the two countries, including three wars and a common border which both sides have the majority of their troops deployed, make the border, especially in the Kashmir region a potential flashpoint that could result in a nuclear exchange. The DOD first is very concerned with the immediate demands a nuclear exchange would put upon the United States military. DOD envisions requests for disaster relief up to and including assistance with decontamination would be overwhelming. Second the DOD is concerned that the use of nuclear weapons by India or Pakistan might affect the calculations of states in other regions that might use nuclear weapons against U.S. interests. As the DOD is charged with protecting U.S. interests worldwide it is very much in the interest of the United States military to "cap, reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction."⁶³

The United States has chosen a strategy to first attempt to reduce tensions to avoid conflicts between the two countries and inhibit nuclear weapon technology exports to India and Pakistan. The United States seeks to create a climate in which India and Pakistan's sense of security is increased through the application of confidence building measures. U.S. goals are to have both countries recognize the inherent costs and risks inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons. By inhibiting exports of nuclear weapon and missile technology to India and Pakistan the United States hopes to discourage third countries from supporting such programs. With this in mind, the United States also realizes that there is strong public support for the nuclear weapons program in both of the

⁶³ Statement of the Joseph Nye, Asst. Secretary of Defense, before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, March 9, 1995.

democracies of India and Pakistan. To overcome this obstacle, the United States looks for ways to have the political elites of both countries inform their public of the risks and costs of maintaining nuclear weapons.⁶⁴

To reduce tensions between India and Pakistan the DOD specifically has chosen a strategy to build trust and cooperation between the United States and India and the United States and Pakistan through military to military ties. The DOD through military ties hopes to build a healthy strategic relationships by emphasizing shared interests and defense cooperation with each country. To build trust between the two countries, the United States intends to help both sides understand each others defense policies and strategic intentions. The pentagon feels by creating transparency in both Pakistan and India's defense strategy, planning, programs and defense budgets will increase stability and reduce tensions between the two adversaries. To this end in Pakistan, the DOD has revived a defense consultative group that will at least exchange information about defense policies and planning between the United States and Pakistan. Another area in which the United States hopes to reduce tensions and build trust between the United States and each country is through international peacekeeping operations. DOD currently feels that the uniqueness of the peacekeeping arena provides a means not only to hold United States bi-lateral military exercises with each country, but in the peacekeeping arena, a chance for a U.S. led trilateral exercise may exist that should build mutual trust and confidence between India and Pakistan.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Statement of Robin Raphael, Assistant Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: South Asian Proliferation Issues, March 9, 1995.

⁶⁵ Prepared remarks of William J. Perry to the Foreign Policy Association, "Establishing strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan," Defense Issues (31 Jan 1995) 10 no. 10. /defenselink/ internet via WWW.

While the DOD appears to favor a slow, controlled approach to reduce tensions and build confidence between India and Pakistan through military to military ties, the U.S. State Department appears to be open and ready to discuss any option to achieve a breakthrough in nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. While the United States appears uninterested in discussing nuclear nonproliferation in the global context that India desires, it has strongly supported regional and extra-regional dialogues that Pakistan has proposed. While India remains steadfast in its position of discussion of the issue only at the global level, the United States has become frustrated in its attempts to persuade Pakistan and India to move simultaneously toward nuclear disarmament. Within this context, in April of 1994, the U. S. State Department initiated a proposal to entice Pakistan to unilaterally cap their nuclear program. Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, proposed to seek a one time waiver of the Pressler Amendment from Congress in order to release 38 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan in exchange for verifiable capping of Pakistan's nuclear program. The proposal was ultimately shelved because of Pakistan's unwillingness to allow on site inspections of its nuclear facilities and Pakistan's unwillingness to roll back its nuclear program unilaterally without a corresponding Indian move.⁶⁶

The United States has realized that the underlying cause for the nuclear stalemate in South Asia is the difference in perceptions of all three parties concerning the immediate needs and long term effects of both countries maintaining a nuclear weapon capability. The drain on scarce resources and damage to international relationships are acceptable to both India and Pakistan, because they both

⁶⁶ Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1994: The Politics of Confrontation," Asian Survey (February 1995) 35 no. 2, 145-146.

believe that a nuclear option is vital to national security interests.⁶⁷ Pakistan's leaders currently feel that because of the weakening of their conventional forces as a result of the Pressler Amendment, a nuclear capability has become much more important in deterring India which is able to maintain superiority in both conventional and nuclear capability. India, on the other hand, sees a nuclear capability as a cost effective deterrent against the militarily superior Chinese.⁶⁸ As both countries see a nuclear weapon capability as the final arbitrator from a larger regional adversary, the United States views the capability as undermining each country's security and limiting their options in dealing with their political differences.⁶⁹

The Department of Defense has resigned itself to believe that the Pressler Amendment is a fact of life and not likely to go away. Further, the DOD has explicitly said to India that arms sales are not going to be on the table in the foreseeable future in spite of trying to forge closer military to military ties. Against this background the Clinton Administration as late as July 1995 has proposed once again to seek from Congress a waiver of the Pressler Amendment to deliver more than \$1.4 billion in arms which were frozen by the Pressler Amendment to Pakistan. While the administration is not proposing delivery of the F-16s (which they hope to sell to a third country enabling Pakistan to recoup its investment), the equipment does include three P-3 Orion aircraft, Harpoon surface to surface missiles, Sidewinder air to air missiles, artillery pieces, radar equipment, aircraft spare parts and rockets for use on the Cobra helicopter.⁷⁰ The proposed transfer of military equipment from

⁶⁷ Robin Raphael before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (March 9, 1995).

⁶⁸ William Perry, "Establishing Strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan."

⁶⁹ Robin Raphael before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (March 9, 1995).

⁷⁰ New Delhi, (July 31, 1995), Reuter News Service. Internet via WWW.

the United States in an administration attempt to circumvent the Pressler Amendment provides a basis for examining the historical debate concerning the Pressler Amendment. The debate has historically pitted the U.S. executive branch against Congress in pursuit of national security objectives in the region.

V. HISTORICAL DEBATE CONCERNING THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT

The historical debate concerning the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act exemplifies the difference in perception of national security interests and objectives between the executive branch and Congress. The rationale used by proponents of sanctions and arms transfers to Pakistan has evolved since the late 1970s, when sanctions were first used by the United States against Pakistan in pursuit of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. In 1995 many in Congress now view the Pressler Amendment as a highly symbolic piece of legislation that underscores a U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation throughout the world. As of September of 1995, the Executive branch and a growing number in Congress view the Pressler Amendment as a roadblock to improving U.S.-Pakistan relations. Improving U.S.-Pakistan relations is now seen by the executive branch and members of Congress as an essential element to achieve current U.S. security objectives in the region.

Originally, the majority of Congress viewed the Pressler Amendment as an essential tool to monitor Pakistan's nuclear program. After Pressler sanctions were invoked in 1990, Congress felt that consistent application of the Pressler standard would act as a strong deterrent to other countries who might seek to develop nuclear weapons. Most recently, the majority of Congress now views Pressler as a symbol of U.S. resolve to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The executive branch in contrast has had to deal with the absolutes of the Pressler Amendment in the context of changing U.S. interests and objectives in South Asia. The executive branch, unlike Congress, is responsible for defining and maintaining the scope of bilateral relationships with countries throughout the world. Pakistani protests to the United States over non delivery of F-16s and other contracted

military hardware leaves the executive branch little flexibility to improve relations with Pakistan. In the debate over the Pressler Amendment, the perceptions of the executive branch have also evolved. Since the legislation was enacted in 1985, the executive branch rationale for arms transfers has evolved from arms transfers to prevent Pakistani nuclear weapon development, to arms transfers for restraint in nuclear weapon development, to finally arms transfers to salvage a severely strained bilateral relationship with Pakistan. While the majority of Congress has seen the legislation as necessary to deter or halt other countries from pursuing nuclear weapon development, the executive branch has found it necessary to try and circumvent the amendment in hopes of improving U.S.-Pakistan relations. The executive branch views a good bilateral relationship with Pakistan as essential to achieving both nuclear nonproliferation goals and national security objectives in the region.

A. ORIGINS OF LEGISLATION

In the mid 1970s, Congress became concerned about increasing evidence of international trade in technologies associated with producing nuclear weapons. At the time, Countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, Brazil, and Taiwan were considered to be actively engaged in acquiring nuclear weapon technology. In an attempt to halt such efforts, Congress enacted the Glenn/Symington Amendment to the FAA. Glenn/Symington provided that countries importing or exporting nuclear weapon technology would be cut off from U.S. economic and military assistance. In 1979, President Carter invoked the Glenn/Symington Amendment against Pakistan after intelligence information confirmed that Pakistan was building a secret uranium enrichment facility.⁷¹

⁷¹ Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 1996. Letter from Senator John Glenn to President Clinton dated 19 April 95 submitted for the record. Unpublished transcript retrieved via internet.

In 1981 Congress allowed President Reagan to waive provisions of the FAA in Pakistan's case in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Presidential power to waive nuclear nonproliferation provisions was given in section 620E of the FAA for a period of six years. In the early 1980s, Congress had become impatient with Pakistan's apparent determination to continue the development of a nuclear weapon option. To deflect congressional suspicion, the Reagan Administration sought verification from Pakistan that its peaceful nuclear research program did not accelerate or turn toward weapon development. Verification of Pakistan's peaceful research objectives was found in Pakistan's agreement to the United States that it would not enrich uranium past 5%.⁷² A threshold of uranium enrichment to 5% would preclude Pakistan from fabricating a nuclear weapon which requires a higher level of enriched uranium metal to assemble the nuclear core of a weapon.⁷³ To guard against further nuclear weapon development by Pakistan, Congress passed subsection (e) to the presidential waiver authority found in section 620E of the FAA. Subsection (e) is specific to Pakistan and requires that the President certify annually to Congress "that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that proposed aid will reduce significantly the risk that it will possess one."⁷⁴

⁷² Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: An Appraisal," The Nation (Oct 1, 1989).

⁷³ Mushahid Hussain, "Nuclear Issue: Ball is Now in Pakistan's Court," The Nation (Nov 29, 1990) 4.

⁷⁴ Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff, 2.

B. ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT

In 1990 President Bush could not certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. On 1 October 1990, all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan was suspended. Since the cut off of aid, on three separate occasions the executive branch has attempted to circumvent the Pressler Amendment. In July 1992 Congress challenged the Bush Administration's interpretation of the amendment. Congress became concerned when it learned that the executive branch was granting export licenses to private companies to engage in commercial arms sales to Pakistan. In an effort to block these sales, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated the interpretation of the exact wording of the Pressler Amendment. Proponents of the Pressler Amendment argued that the wording explicitly restricted all arms sales or transfers from the United States. The Bush Administration contended that granting export licenses under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act did not violate the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Since the Pressler Amendment was part of the Foreign Assistance Act, the executive branch successfully argued that Pressler restrictions on arms transfers only applied to U.S. government military grants and financing to the government of Pakistan and did not preclude transactions between government of Pakistan and private U.S. companies. The executive branch deflected congressional pressure by stipulating that export licenses would only be granted on a case by case review. Further, the administration contended that licenses would only be granted for expendable munitions and spare parts for weapon systems already in place

by the Pakistani military. Using these guidelines, the Bush Administration assured Congress that no new technology (conventional or nuclear) or weapon system upgrades would be licensed for transfer to Pakistan.⁷⁵

In another attempt to circumvent the Pressler Amendment, the State Department in 1994 sounded out members of Congress on a proposal for a one time waiver of Pressler restrictions. The proposal would allow the delivery of 28 F-16 aircraft from Lockheed to Pakistan. These aircraft were part of a long standing order, already paid for by Pakistan, but could not be delivered because of section 620E(e). The State Department's strategy was for Pakistan to halt production of additional fissionable material in exchange for the aircraft.⁷⁶ The proposal was ultimately shelved when Pakistan showed reluctance to make a unilateral move to cap its program, which also would have allowed international inspections of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.⁷⁷

In 1995 the Brown Amendment to Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1996 represents the Clinton Administration's latest attempt to circumvent the Pressler Amendment. The Brown Amendment allows for the transfer of arms that Pakistan had either purchased from Washington or sent to the United States for repair or upgrade prior to 1 October 1990. Pressler sanctions have precluded the ultimate delivery of this arms

⁷⁵ Committee on Foreign Relations, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment: Commercial Sales to Pakistan, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., July 30, 1992 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1992). Pages 3-5 refer to the argument given for a broad interpretation of the Pressler Amendment to cover private sales of arms to Pakistan. Pages 93-97 summarize the Bush Administration's interpretation of the Pressler Amendment and its applicability to private sales of arms to Pakistan.

⁷⁶ Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff, 1.

⁷⁷ Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1994: The Politics of Confrontation," Asian Survey 35 no. 2 (February, 1995): 145-146.

package presented in the Table 1 below. While this package does not include the controversial F-16's, congressional proponents of the Pressler Amendment see this possible transfer of weapons as undermining the legislative goal of nuclear nonproliferation.

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantities</u>
- P-3C-II Orion maritime Patrol and strike aircraft	3
- Harpoon anti-ship missiles	28
- Aim-9L sidewinder air to air missiles	360
- C-nite night-sighting and targeting kits for Cobra helicopters	18
- M-198 towed howitzers	24
- AN/TPQ 36 artillery-locating radar	4
- AN/ALQ-131 jamming pods for F-16s	numerous
- F-16 engines, spares and support systems	numerous
- Tow 2A missiles for Cobra helicopters	numerous

Table 1. Proposed U.S. Arms Transfer Package for Pakistan.⁷⁸

Since the Pressler Amendment was enacted in 1985, the debate over the Pressler Amendment has displayed a changing rationale for and against sanctions directed at Pakistan. An analysis of congressional debate, concerning attempts to circumvent the Pressler Amendment, provides insight into the changing rationale for and against Pressler.

C. HISTORICAL RATIONALE FOR SANCTIONS

The initial rationale for sanctions against Pakistan is found in the wording of the legislation itself. During the 1980s military and economic aid was granted to Pakistan for two reasons. First, the Reagan Administration wanted to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. The Reagan administration

⁷⁸ Sunil Dasgupta, "A Call To Arms" Asian Defence

also argued that assistance would recognize Pakistan's security needs which ultimately would negate their pursuit of a nuclear weapon capability. Within this framework, the Reagan Administration justified aid to Pakistan as a tool of nuclear nonproliferation policy. The \$4 billion in aid from the United States to Pakistan during this period was granted as Congress allowed repeated presidential waivers of the nuclear provisions of the FAA. Concerned with reports throughout the early 1980s that Pakistan was still pursuing a nuclear option, Congress enacted the Pressler Amendment which transferred the "burden of truth" to the President to demonstrate that aid to Pakistan was "reducing significantly the risk" that Pakistan would pursue a nuclear weapons program.⁷⁹ When President Bush invoked sanctions against Pakistan in 1990, proponents of the Pressler Amendment pointed to the failed logic in an arms for nuclear restraint policy that the Reagan and Bush Administrations had followed. For Congress, the Pressler Amendment provided the litmus test to the success or failure of the Reagan and Bush nonproliferation policies.

In 1992, as the Senate debated the interpretation of the Pressler Amendment, Senator Glenn saw military transfers to Pakistan as "grasping at straws to perpetuate the myth that arms transfers could buy U.S. influence over Pakistan." Senator Glenn also felt that any transfer of spare parts for F-16s, a known delivery platform for nuclear weapons, would only enhance Pakistan's nuclear strike capability.⁸⁰ At the same time, Senator Pressler argued that sanctions against Pakistan could not be lifted because U.S. aid in the "new world order" had to be contingent on human rights, development of democracy, development of free enterprise and for countries to spend less on defense. Linking U.S. aid as a tool of nuclear nonproliferation policy was viewed by Senator Pressler as essential to

⁷⁹ Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 21-23.

⁸⁰ Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 24-25.

discouraging newly independent republics from the Soviet Union and other non nuclear states from seeking a nuclear option.⁸¹ In 1992, the Pressler Amendment moved from being the litmus test to the success or failure of executive branch nonproliferation policy, to legislation designed to deter other countries from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Senator Glenn summed up this transition to global deterrence when he stated:

Congress cannot legislate away another nations nuclear program. However, America is under no obligation to make it any easier for a nation to acquire or enhance such a capability, and in fact, we have a moral and legal duty to make such pursuits quite costly.⁸²

The 1994 deal involving delivery of F-16's to Pakistan in exchange for Pakistani nuclear restraint was never formally debated in Congress. Possibly the greatest obstacle to overcome in the 1994 proposed waiver would be the symbolic nature the F-16 has taken on since Pakistan's acquiring of an "explosive nuclear device." Since Pakistan at this time was considered as nuclear weaponized state in U.S. policy, F-16s were viewed as the primary delivery vehicle for a Pakistan bomb. In 1992, Senator Glenn provided nine conflicting reports from the Reagan and Bush Administrations as to whether the F-16s Pakistan currently held were capable of delivering a nuclear device.⁸³ An F-16 transfer in 1994 would contradict all nuclear nonproliferation goals by providing Pakistan with what Congress then viewed as a primary nuclear strike vehicle.

In September 1995, the proposal for a one time transfer of arms not including F-16s has taken on a new context for proponents of continued sanctions. The recent debate has moved the Pressler

⁸¹ Senator Pressler, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 8.

⁸² Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 32.

⁸³ Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 46-47.

Amendment from being a tool to deter other nations from developing nuclear weapons to become a symbol of American resolve concerning nuclear nonproliferation. Senator Pressler now argues that a waiver of sanctions against Pakistan sends the wrong signal to other countries and undermines U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Senator Pressler argues that by giving Pakistan arms now, the United States would be sending other nations the message that "nuclear proliferation pays." To Senator Pressler, any transfer of arms at this stage would set a terrible precedent for any future U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts throughout the world.⁸⁴

Senator Glenn in September 1995 expressed that the state of Pakistan can no longer be trusted by the United States. Glenn argues that throughout the 1980s the United States had kept its part of the bargain, but were let down by the Pakistanis who used American tax dollars to finance a nuclear weapons program. The latest arms package consisting of spare parts and reliability upgrades for the F-16 would only increase the capability of Pakistan's nuclear delivery vehicle. Glenn emphasized that in 1995 the "underlying fundamental issue is whether the United States has a nonproliferation policy or not."⁸⁵

Proponents of sanctions in the 1995 debate have also introduced new issues in support of continued sanctions. Members of Congress now feel the need to consider balance of power in South Asia and the destabilizing effect of introducing more U.S. weapons into the region. Senator Pressler feels that introduction of U.S. military hardware could "spark a renewed arms race between India and Pakistan." Senator Pressler further stated that in addition to reliability upgrade for F-16s, the transfer

⁸⁴ Senator Pressler, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

⁸⁵ Senator Glenn, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

of additional P-3s with Harpoon missiles would allow Pakistan greater strike and surveillance capabilities. Citing sources in the Indian government, Senator Pressler contends that India would have no choice but to procure additional military equipment if the transfer goes through⁸⁶. Senator Feinstein also cited a transfer of arms at this time could provoke India to deploy the Prithvi missile, heightening border tensions in an already unstable region.⁸⁷

Senator Pressler feels relaxation of the Pressler sanctions could also inadvertently improve the "terrorist" state of Iran's military capability. Pressler noted reports indicating cooperative nuclear weapons development between Iran and Pakistan has been underway for nearly a decade. With Iran and Pakistan already conducting joint naval maneuvers, data from P-3 surveillance of the Indian Ocean would be of critical use to Iran as they seek to expand their naval power in the region.⁸⁸

D. RATIONALE FOR ARMS TRANSFERS

As previously stated, there were two reasons for arms transfers to Pakistan during the 1980s. First the Reagan and Bush administrations felt that arms transfers would recognize the legitimate defense concerns of Pakistan. These defense concerns were identified as the threat from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as the threat that India posed to Pakistan. Second, arms transfers were considered to reduce the risk that Pakistan would pursue a nuclear option if Pakistan had access to sophisticated U.S. military equipment.

⁸⁶ Senator Pressler, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

⁸⁷ Senator Feinstein, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

⁸⁸ Senator Pressler, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

Since U.S. sanctions were invoked in 1990, the rationale for arms transfers has taken on new dimensions. First, proponents for arms transfers have come to the realization that Pakistan does indeed have a nuclear capability and is not likely to give it up in the near future. Second, proponents of arms transfers are assessing the costs sanctions have imposed on U.S.-Pakistan relations.

In 1992 Senator Lugar argued that the United States has to step back and look at what are U.S. goals in nuclear nonproliferation. While Lugar stated the goal should be to decrease nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the United States must assess the tools available to reaching this goal. Senator Lugar agreed that the cut-off of aid is a tool toward nonproliferation, but it should not be considered the ultimate goal. What Lugar feels needs to be examined is the reasons for nuclear proliferation in South Asia and whether the cut-off of arms transfers to Pakistan furthers the goal of nuclear nonproliferation in the subcontinent. Lugar cited Pakistan's nuclear program was a result of the search for a force multiplier in light of their conventional weakness. While Pakistan's force multiplier found in nuclear weapons is similar to the rationale applied by both the United States and the Soviet Union after WWII, sanctions may be pushing Pakistan to further their nuclear capabilities which would not be consistent with U.S. goals in the region.⁸⁹

The proposed transfer of F-16s in 1994 displayed a new rationale for arms transfers. The new rationale displayed a realization that sanctions alone would not reverse Pakistan's nuclear aspirations. The offer of a "carrot" when all the United States offered through Pressler was a "stick" both recognized Pakistan's legitimate defense concerns vis-a- vis India, and the deteriorating Pakistani conventional forces that could push them closer to nuclear weapon dependence. The frustrations of trying to move India and Pakistan simultaneously toward nuclear restraint forced the

⁸⁹ Senator Lugar, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 2-3.

United States to seek a long shot strategy of trying to get Pakistan to make a unilateral move. With little leverage to influence India, the United States once again sought an arms transfer to influence Pakistan. Unlike the Reagan and Bush rationale to reduce the risk nuclear weapon development, the 1994 proposal sought an arms transfer to freeze and verify an established nuclear weapon program.

Presently the debate concerning the Brown Amendment focuses primarily on the deterioration of U.S.-Pakistan relations as a result of four years of U.S. aid sanctions. With little hope of repealing the Pressler Amendment, proponents of a one time arms transfer feel it is necessary to improve severely strained U.S.-Pakistan relations. Sanctions at this time are considered by some in Congress to be hindering U.S. efforts to support the democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto and forestalling cooperative programs between the U.S. and Pakistan concerning counternarcotics and counterterrorism. Proponents of this one time arms transfer have also had to address attacks against the trustworthiness of Pakistan and balance of power considerations in South Asia.

Senator Mikulski believes that the long standing dispute over the delivery of military hardware is hindering U.S. efforts to build strong ties with Pakistan, which she views as crucial to improving our security and furthering U.S. interests in South Asia. Mikulski feels it is critical for the United States to support the Bhutto government at this time. Mikulski argues that Prime Minister Bhutto has transformed Pakistan from a military dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy. Despite Pressler sanctions, Bhutto has proven to be an ally against terrorism and stemming the flow of narcotics from South Asia while liberalizing the Pakistani economy, which are all in the interests of the United States

at this time. Senator Mikulski feels that improved human rights, nonproliferation and greater trade and investment are being held hostage by this "largely symbolic issue."⁹⁰

Senator Brown feels that the honor of the United States is at stake over a willingness by Congress not to honor a contractual agreement it made with Pakistan prior to sanctions being invoked. While Pakistan looks at the non delivery of F-16s, paid for by Pakistan, as the most inflammatory issue, Senator Brown only argues for a disposition of parts and unrepared equipment that will help restore U.S. credibility to the Pakistani people. To Senator Brown it is a matter of simple fairness, the United States either must return the Pakistani money or deliver the equipment.⁹¹

To combat accusations against the trustworthiness of Pakistan, Senator Brown offered a history of U.S.-Pakistan relations recounting the numerous times that Pakistan faced the threat of Soviet aggression because of their relations with the United States. From Gary Power's U-2 flight being shot down over the Soviet Union after launching from Peshawar, to Pakistan's role in supporting the Afghan resistance, Senator Brown feels the Pakistanis took considerable risks at the request of the United States.⁹²

In 1995 proponents of a one time arms transfer offered a response to balance of power considerations. Statements from Stephen Cohen (director of Programs in Arms Control, University of Illinois) and George Tanham (Vice President of Rand Corporation) expressed that the proposed

⁹⁰ Senator Mikulski, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

⁹¹ Senator Brown, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

⁹² Senator Brown, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

arms package would not change the balance at all since there is no balance now. India currently dominates the region with at least a two to one superiority in all categories of conventional arms. James Clad, a professor from Georgetown, points to an arms transfer as providing the United States an opportunity to "provide an equalizing hand in the subcontinental mismatch of conventional weaponry." Clad stated regardless if there was a relaxation of Pressler standards or not, India is searching at present for substantial arms purchases including very high technology MIG aircraft.⁹³

Proponents of both sanctions and arms transfers offer compelling arguments to further U.S. interests in South and Southwest Asia. The Pressler Amendment has become a symbol of American resolve to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The global context Pressler has taken on undermines U.S. efforts to address critical regional interests and objectives. Containing Iran and Iraq and pursuing nuclear nonproliferation goals in the region require the United States improve relations with Pakistan. Proponents of sanctions must consider what are the immediate and possible long term costs to U.S. national security objectives in the region from continued adherence to Pressler standards that ultimately equate to strained U.S.-Pakistan relations.

⁹³ Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown Amendment.

VI. THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT AND THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As the debate concerning the Pressler Amendment continues, conflict between the Pressler Amendment and the U.S. national security strategy creates immediate and possible long term costs to U.S. foreign policy objectives in South and Southwest Asia. To accurately assess these costs, it is necessary to evaluate historical Pakistani foreign relations, especially with the United States, in the context of current U.S. and Pakistani security interests and objectives. To date, U.S. sanctions against Pakistan have not persuaded Pakistan to abandon its nuclear weapons development program.. Continued sanctions leave Pakistan with few options to address their own security concerns vis-a-vis India. It is the pursuit of these options that will most likely move Pakistan to counter U.S. interests in the region. Instead of cooperative relations with the United States, continued sanctions may push Pakistan to become a state requiring a U.S. policy of confrontation and containment.

Since becoming an independent state in 1947, Pakistan's security concerns have not significantly changed. Both during and after the U.S.-Soviet cold war, Pakistan remains threatened from the militarily superior India. In the post cold war era, Pakistan continues to seek alignments with other countries in order to receive economic and military aid to deter Indian aggression. Pakistan's recent foreign policy efforts display a country whose threat has not changed, but historical alignments and alliances have been undermined with the demise of the Soviet Union. Without a Soviet threat in South Asia, neither the United States nor China appears willing to become deeply involved with Pakistan due to the risks of becoming embroiled in the Indo-Pak dispute. During the cold war, tilting toward India or Pakistan at the expense of relations with the other state was acceptable to the United States based on the Soviet threat to the region. Now both the United States and China apparently are

and China apparently are not willing to sacrifice relations with India, due to its size and the economic potential of the Indian market. Chinese and Indian efforts to demarcate the border and increase bilateral trade, while the United States seeks balanced ties with India and Pakistan, all point to a new balance of power in South Asia that Pakistan is trying to adjust to.

The Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act represents a U.S. congressional perception of an absence of threat to U.S. interests in the region. Without a clear and identifiable threat such as Soviet expansion, the U.S. geopolitical objective of nuclear nonproliferation has risen to drive U.S. relations with Pakistan. The Pressler Amendment, which became law in 1985, prioritizes nuclear nonproliferation goals over Pakistan's geostrategic value to U.S. regional security objectives. Throughout the cold war, the status of U.S.-Pakistan relations was defined by the amount of concrete military aid Pakistan would receive from the United States. Historically, when the United States would cut off military aid, Pakistan would make a pragmatic adjustment in its foreign policy to counter the persistent threat a more powerful India represented to their national security. Pakistani shifts in foreign policy would often run counter to U.S. interests in the region. The Pressler Amendment and China's reevaluation of foreign policy objectives after the end of the cold war has left Pakistan both militarily and politically isolated in the region. Pakistan's recent moves toward the CAR and attempts to create a broad based economic and political base by uniting the Islamic countries of Southwest and Central Asia could run counter to U.S. interests and objectives in the region.

A. IMMEDIATE COSTS

The immediate conflict between the Pressler Amendment and U.S. national security objectives is rooted in the geostrategic significance Pakistan has taken on in the post-cold war world. To be an

effective strategy for containment of Iran and Iraq, CENTCOM has to consider inclusion of Pakistan. Pakistan, because of its location, serves as the eastern flank in the CENTCOM containment strategy.

The Pressler Amendment currently thwarts the CENTCOM strategy to strengthen Pakistan's military for participation in collective defense efforts in Southwest Asia. Pressler, by barring all military sales from the United States to Pakistan has decreased the mission readiness of the Pakistani forces. Since the preponderance of Pakistan's current arms were procured from the United States, Pakistan lacks the ability to procure the spare parts to maintain this combat equipment, and the ability to upgrade or modernize their current inventory of weapons. While Pakistan contributed two brigades to the coalition forces during Desert Storm, the state of their current conventional forces would limit their ability to serve in future coalitions against threats to U.S. interests in Southwest Asia.⁹⁴

The Pressler Amendment also precludes Pakistan from being able to participate in the United States sponsored International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. This program is considered critical by the DoD in their efforts to reduce tensions and create transparency between the militaries of Pakistan and India. While the Pressler Amendment does not bar members of the Pakistani military from receiving advanced education in the United States, it does not allow the DoD to fund these students. With costs of this program nearly \$100,000 per student, the Pakistanis are not able to take advantage of these courses.

While the Pressler Amendment does not bar the United States from pre-positioning combat equipment in Pakistan, current Pakistani domestic support for U.S. access in Pakistan would probably be weak because of the Pressler Amendment. On a recent trip to Pakistan, Secretary of

⁹⁴ Statement of Joseph Nye before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 9, 1995.

Defense Perry noted that everyone from taxicab drivers to schoolchildren were well versed in the details of the Pressler Amendment. Domestic support for the United States in Pakistan has taken a downward trend as the Pakistani people are "mad as hell" about Pressler.⁹⁵

The United States also wants to support moderate Islamic countries, especially ones like Pakistan which are considered democratic and making significant progress to a more open market based economy. Historically, the tenure of leaders in Pakistan has been influenced by the ability of the leader to provide a credible defense to deter Indian aggression while simultaneously increasing the welfare of the people. The Pressler Amendment undermines the Pakistani leader's ability to provide both a credible defense and improve the welfare of the people. Since the majority of Pakistani weapons are from the United States, Pakistan's ability to maintain and upgrade these weapons is negated by Pressler. Pakistan is often accused of spending too much of its national income on defense, which ultimately impedes economic growth. Without the ability to obtain spare parts or upgrade kits for its existing weapon systems, Pakistan will ultimately increase defense expenditures by buying complete new weapon systems on the open market since their U.S. inventory is becoming obsolete.

Concerning nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the Pressler amendment currently undermines U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to roll back its nuclear weapons program. The United States perceives a nuclear weaponized subcontinent as unstable. In contrast, the Pakistanis conclude that a nuclear capability is even more important in maintaining their security since the Pressler

⁹⁵ Remarks of William Perry, "Establishing Strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan."

Amendment has significantly weakened Pakistan's conventional forces. Under the current situation both the Pakistan military and civilian leadership are emphatic in stating that Pakistan should not give up its nuclear capability.⁹⁶

B. LONG TERM COSTS

The Pressler Amendment, which precludes better U.S.-Pakistan relations, could have negative long term effects on U.S. interests in Southwest Asia. By denying Pakistan military aid, the United States effectively has pushed Pakistan closer to Iran. Instead of containing Iran, the Pressler Amendment actually may create or expand an Iranian sphere of influence in the region. As the Pakistanis reach out to both Iran and the CAR, the United States is risking the creation of a anti-western Islamic block of countries near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. While the United States is concerned about Iran's recent fortifications in the Straits of Hormuz and purchases of more modern weapon systems, the Pressler Amendment offers the United States little leverage to control both the type and amount of arms now entering the region. As Pakistan is pushed closer to Iran, the threat of Pakistan transferring nuclear weapon technology to Iran will also increase.

The Pressler Amendment, designed to stop Pakistani nuclear aspirations, has actually replicated the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations following the 1971 war that led Pakistan's original quest for a nuclear weapon capability. Now, as in the early 1970's, Pakistan sees a U.S. President severely constrained by Congress to aid Pakistan. Even an attempt by the Clinton Administration to receive a one time waiver of Pressler, fall well short of what the Pakistan requires now. With a weakening of conventional forces due to Pressler, Pakistan is unable to give up its nuclear option. To substitute

⁹⁶ Remarks of William Perry, "Establishing Strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan."

a credible conventional deterrent in place of a nuclear deterrent for Pakistan requires Pakistan have full access to the U.S. arms market. The effectiveness of modern U.S. weapons systems was well documented and viewed by the world during Desert Storm. Smart bombs and a night vision capability were critical to the coalition victory in Kuwait. Access to the most modern weapon systems may provide the impetus the Pakistani leadership requires to more aggressively work to justify capping its nuclear weapon program to the Pakistani people.

The United States during different periods of the cold war sought to win the alignment of India. India due to its population and democratic government was often viewed by the United States as the geopolitical prize in the cold war battle for influence in South Asia. These Indo-centric views have surfaced again in the post cold war era due to the size and potential of the emerging Indian economy. This emphasis, which both the west and China appear to want to cultivate, disregards the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to U.S. national security strategy in Southwest Asia concerning containment of Iran and Iraq. Pakistan serving as the eastern flank to this containment strategy could become a frontline state once again for the United States. Pressler undermines Pakistan's participation as a friendly nation since the United States would be unable to provide security assistance to a level which would allow Pakistan to become an effective member in this cooperative defense agreement. The Pressler Amendment, which has severely constrained US.-Pakistan relations in the post cold war era, impedes the United States from achieving national security objectives in the region.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The DoD has initiated a unique strategy to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. The DoD strategy is a gradualist approach based upon first achieving strong bilateral military to military

contacts with both India and Pakistan. Defense consultative groups, engaged in both countries, will in the long run provide each side the confidence building measures now absent in the subcontinent to decrease the likelihood of a rapid escalation of tensions that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Without the competition from the Soviet Union in the region, the United States chances to achieve balanced relations with both countries is greatly improved. The success of achieving balanced relations with both India and Pakistan however, is contingent on both Pakistan and India perceiving a level playing field as the United States shifts policy in the region.

Currently, Pakistan seeks recognition from the United States that Pakistan is an influential state in the region whose interests in world affairs and South Asia are similar to U.S. interests and objectives. Pakistani participation in UN peacekeeping operations, joint counterterrorism and counternarcotic efforts with the United States, reforming the Pakistani economy, and support of U.S. efforts for multilateral dialogue in the region concerning nuclear weapons all point to a consensus of threat between the United States and Pakistan that often was absent during the cold war. A new consensus of threat between Pakistan and the United States lays the foundation for what should be a close cooperative bilateral relationship. Current U.S.-Pakistan relations and ultimately bilateral cooperation is impeded by the Pressler Amendment. Without access to U.S. arms, Pakistan does not perceive a level playing field with the militarily superior India in U.S. foreign policy. The Pressler Amendment politically tilts U.S. efforts in favor of India.

To correct this impediment to U.S. efforts to achieve balanced ties, the Pressler Amendment should be repealed. The Pressler Amendment has become a symbol of American resolve to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The symbolic global context that the Pressler Amendment has taken on conflicts with U.S. regional interests. U.S. security strategy in the region requires

cooperative bilateral relations throughout the region. The symbolic nature of the Pressler Amendment negates the potential gains of close U.S. relations with Pakistan. Senator Glenn was correct when he stated that Congress could not legislate away a country's bomb program, but Congress can make it costly. Despite Pressler sanctions, Pakistan has not taken significant steps toward capping or reducing its nuclear weapon program. The greatest irony in Senator Glenn's words is that adherence to Pressler standards in U.S. relations with Pakistan ultimately costs the United States, as Pressler serves as a roadblock to achieve national security objectives in the region.

The current arms package including F-16s should be delivered to Pakistan. The delivery of this weapons package would send Pakistan the signal that the United States recognizes both legitimate Pakistani security concerns and the influential role that Pakistan can serve in the South and Southwest Asia. Pakistan must understand that the transfer of this weapons package does have strings attached. The United States needs to emphasize that further arms transfers will be considered in the context of Pakistani efforts toward cooperative defense of the Middle East, participating in U.S. efforts to reduce tensions in the Indian subcontinent and gradual steps toward nuclear nonproliferation.

The U.S. defense consultative groups working in both Pakistan and India can play an active role in precluding an Indo-Pak arms race as a result of renewed U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan. High level military to military contacts between the United States and Pakistan and the United States and India were never present during the cold war to produce transparency and confidence building measures necessary to reduce tensions and preclude arms races between India and Pakistan. Indian objectives to this transfer should be addressed through the defense consultative group as essential to achieving common U.S. and Indian interests, specifically defense of the Middle East and the

creation of a fundamental building block to reduce tensions leading to a more stable region that would be economically advantageous to India.

Instead of isolating Pakistan, the United States needs to elevate Pakistan to a more regional leadership role in support of U.S. national security interests and objectives. In this way, Pakistan can once again become a frontline state for the United States in achieving mutually beneficial national security objectives.

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